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NOTES
Pleading-Effect of Suit for Injunction on
Subsequent Suit for Damages
On May 7, 1952, Ernest and Mabel Bahm, Theodore Sohl, and
Willy and Alvina Wischmann obtained a decree enjoining Ralph
Raikes from diverting the flow of certain creeks onto plaintiffs'
lands. This judgment was affirmed by the Nebraska Supreme
Court.1 On June 10, 1954, the Wischmanns brought an action
against Raikes to recover monetary relief for damages done to
their property by defendant's diversion of water. The case was
tried before a jury and a verdict was returned in favor of plaintiffs
for $10,000. This verdict was reversed and remanded on the ground
that the evidence did not sustain plaintiffs' pleaded cause of action. 2
Upon rehearing, the court concluded that they were in error in
the original opinion, and substituted another in its place.3  Held:
Where multiple party plaintiffs bring a suit for an injunction
and such an injunction is issued, one of the original plaintiffs may
not bring a subsequent suit for damages sustained prior to the
issuance of the injunction by the thing enjoined.
The court's holding stems from the rule that a plaintiff may
not split his cause of action. This rule has been exhaustively dis-
cussed, 4 and the reasons for it have been summarized by one au-
thority as being to prevent harassment of defendants, wasting the
court's time, and multiplicity of suits.- However, where this "split-
ting" involves an action in equity and a subsequent action at law,
as in the subject case, the authorities have been far from unani-
mous.6 In determining whether one or two causes of action exist
in this situation, the determining factor frequently is the extent
to which law and equity have merged under the code provisions
in a particular jurisdiction.7
1 Bahm v. Raikes, 160 Neb. 503, 70 N.W.2d 507 (1955).
2 Wischmann v. Raikes, 167 Neb. 251, 92 N.W.2d 708 (1958).
3 Wischmann v. Raikes, 168 Neb. 728, 97 N.W.2d 551 (1959).
4 1 AM. JUR. Actions §§ 96-121 (1936); 1 C.J.S. Actions§§ 102-06 (1936).
5 See CLARK, CODE PLEADINGS § 73 (2d ed. 1947).
6 For an exhaustive survey see Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d 446 (1952); and Re-
statement, Judgments § 66.
7 Such a distinction was made in the leading case of Perdue v. Ward, 88
W.Va. 371, 106 S.E. 874 (1921), (subsequent damage action allowed),
in distinguishing Gilbert v. Boak Fish Co., 86 Minn. 365, 90 N.W. 767,
(1902), (subsequent damage action denied), wherein the court stated:
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Therefore, in considering the wisdom of such a rule in Ne-
braska, it becomes necessary to inspect the provisions of section
25-1018 which states:
The distinction between actions at law and suits in equity and the
forms of all such actions and suits heretofor existing, are abolished,
and in their place there shall be hereafter but one form of action,
which shall be called a 'civil action'.
The majority in justifying their holding state:
The basis for the breadth of this rule is the fact that in this state
there has been a complete merger of legal and equitable remedies.9
Thus the court extends section 25-101 to include a merger of
remedies as well as actions. To sustain this proposition, the court
quotes the following from Hopkins v. Washington County: 10
In this state there is but one form of action, to be called a civil
action, . . . in which either relief may be sought and obtained,...
It is noted that the court said "either relief may be sought," (em-
phasis added) and not that both reliefs shall or must be sought
in one action. City of Beatrice v. Gage County,1 the other case
cited by the court, uses the same permissive language. Conse-
quently neither case cited by the majority gives complete justifi-
cation for an extension of section 25-101 to include a merger of
legal and equitable remedies.
To the contrary, several decisions of long standing show that
such a complete merger under section 25-101 has never been ac-
complished by this court, and that abolition of common law names
and forms of action has not changed the essential character of
judicial remedies. 1 2 Thus, the effect of the instant decision is to
extend section 25-101 beyond all previous decisions.' s
"But it will be observed that this decision was influenced by
the code practice adopted in that state, for it is stated therein
that the code system of practice was undoubtedly designed to
avoid a multiplicity of suits by enabling parties to settle and
determine in one action all matters of difference between
them arising out of or relating to the same transaction."
8 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-101 (Reissue 1956).
9 Supra note 3, at 739.
10 56 Neb. 596, 77 N.W. 53 (1898).
11 130 Neb. 850, 266 N.W. 777 (1936).
12 State v. Barney, 133 Neb. 676, 276 N.W. 676 (1937); Wilcox v. Saunders,
4 Neb. 569 (1876); Hart v. Barnes, 24 Neb. 782, 40 N.W. 322 (1888);
Fuchs v. Parson Const. Co., 166 Neb. 188, 88 N.W.2d 648 (1958).
13 Supra note 3, at 771-80.
NOTES
Under Nebraska statute and case law, prior to this decision,
a strong argument could be made for allowing a plaintiff to bring
an action in equity and then an action at law. An even more
compelling argument could be made where the original action in
equity was brought by numerous plaintiffs, as in the subject case.
Several plaintiffs, seeking damages caused by diversion of water,
would have differences in proof relating to their individual land,
crops, buildings, and other personal property damaged. To require
that all these damage claims be joined with the equitable action,
and hence adduce all this evidence in one lawsuit, would confuse
not only the plaintiffs, their attorneys, the court, the jury (if
present), but the defendants as well.
This reasoning was summarized by J. Hammond McNish in
his article, Joinder and Splitting Causes of Action,14 where in
discussing whether one or two causes of action would exist, he
said:
The first view has the desired effect of limiting litigation, but
there are serious logical difficulties obstructing its acceptance, es-
pecially where several plaintiffs are involved, and the better rea-
soning would seem to favor the second. In a suit for an injunc-
tion, ordinarily the primary right invaded or threatened with in-
vasion is the broad right to conduct business or other activities
free from inequitable conduct and frequently, as in the Ledingham
case, it is a right in which many may be interested and the injunc-
tion which protects that right will affect all of complainants so as
to allow them to join. The primary right, for the trespass of
which damages are sought, is, on the other hand, a personal right
affecting each personally and not affecting all, so that several
plaintiffs may not join in a suit for their separate damages caused
by the wrong enjoined.
This view is not only supported by the better reasoning, but
by statute as well. Section 25-70215 states:
The causes of action so united must affect all the parties to the
action, and not require different places of trial.
To this the court has added that two or more plaintiffs having
several claims may not join in one suit, even though such claims
are similar and arise out of the same transaction, because each
claim and the relief demanded to it does not affect all the parties
to the action.16 Therefore, in a factual situation such as that pre-
14 26 NEB. L. REV. 42, 67 (1948). See also note, 19 NEB. L. BULL. 156
(1940).
15 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-702 (Reissue 1956).
16 Shull v. Barton, 56 Neb. 716, 77 N.W. 132 (1898); Strawn v. First Nat'l
Bank of Humboldt, 77 Neb. 414, 109 N.W. 384 (1906).
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sented in the Wischmann case, the plaintiffs would have been
precluded by law from joining their damage claims, if they had
not also sought equitable relief.
The majority disregard this reasoning when they state:
There is no doubt that the Wischmanns could have obtained both
types of relief had they seen fit to do so.17
In support of the above statement, the court cites Brchan v. Crete
Mills' s and Armbruster v. Stanton-Pilger Drainage District.19 The
latter case affirms the former and both state that it is permissible
to join damages in an equity action, not mandatory, and neither
case involves multiple party plaintiffs. 20  Had the Wischmanns or
any other plaintiff joined their damages to the equity action, they
would have precluded the other plaintiffs from also joining their
damages, under section 25-702 and the applicable cases 21 prior to
the Wischmann decision. Thus, their failure to obtain both types
of relief was more than a failure to "see fit to do so."
Later, in attempting to answer this multiplicity problem, the
court quotes from Schriener v. Witte 22 as follows:
It is a well settled principle of equity jurisprudence that, where
a court of equity has obtained jurisdiction of a cause for any pur-
pose, it will retain it for all, and will proceed to a final determina-
tion of the case, adjudicate all matters in issue, and thus avoid
unnecessary litigation. 23
In applying this principle, the court assumes that the numerous
damage claims of the multiple plaintiffs are "all matters in issue,"
and thereby avoids the problems presented in forcing these plain-
tiffs to join their legal and equitable claims.
It is submitted that a rule allowing one of many plaintiffs in
an injunction action to bring a subsequent action for damages,
would be more just, would be as c6nsistent with the reasons un-
derlying this area of law,24 and would not result in as much legal
confusion, as the Wischmann holding.
17 Supra note 3, at 738.
18 155 Neb. 505, 52 N.W.2d 333 (1952).
19 165 Neb. 459, 86 N.W.2d 56 (1957).
20 The Brchan case involved two plaintiffs, who were brothers jointly
owning the same property, while the Armbruster case involved a hus-
band and wife who jointly owned the same property.
21 Supra note 12.
22 143 Neb. 109, 8 N.W.2d 831 (1943).
23 Supra note 3, at 745.
24 Supra note 5.
NOTES
Such a rule was adopted by the Nebraska court i) Ledingham
v. Farmers Irrigation District,25 where plaintiff recovered damages
from defendant for failure to deliver water, after plaintiff and
others had obtained equitable relief against the same defendant. 26
This case has been compared with Shepard v. City of Friend,
2
'
7
which the court now accepts as controlling. In the Shepard case,
the court denied an action for damages by four plaintiffs, after
injunctive relief had been denied to these plaintiffs and two oth-
ers.28  In denying the injunction, the court had determined that
there were no damages, and this determination of no damage was
held to be binding in the subsequent suit. But such a determina-
tion was not present in either the Bahm2 9 or Vonburg3° cases, as
in both the injunction was granted, and damages were not con-
sidered by the court in the injunction action. Thus, the holding
in Shepard that determination of no damage was binding in a
subsequent action would not apply in either case, and the Leding-
ham holding should control the Wischmann situation.
However, the court refused to follow Ledingham and distin-
guished it "by reason of the fact that injury or damage was no
part of the cause of action in the Ledingham case and did not
properly belong to the subject of that litigation."' 31  The court's
distinction is that since the original equity action was for a pro-
ration of water based on a contract, damages were not involved,
while in the Shepard and Wischmann cases, the original action
was for the abatement of a nuisance and proof of damage would
be necessary.
It seems hard to conceive that damage to crops is less involved
in the failure to deliver water, than damage to land is involved
in the unlawful diversion of water onto that land. It is true that
one arises in contract and the other in tort, but it does not neces-
sarily follow that injury and damage are a part of the latter while
not a part of the former.
25 135 Neb. 276, 281 N.W. 20 (1938).
26 Vonburg v. Farmers Irrigation District, 128 Neb. 784, 260 N.W. 383
(1935).
27 141 Neb. 866, 5 N.W.2d 108 (1942).
28 Hall v. City of Friend, 134 Neb. 652, 279 N.W. 346 (1938).
29 The Bahm case, supra note 1, was the equitable action preceeding the
Wischmann case, supra note 3.
30 The Vonburg case, supra note 26, was the equitable action preceeding
the Ledingham case, supra note 25.
31 Supra note 3, at 745.
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In addition to these legal difficulties, the Wischmann case
poses certain questions of tactical significance to the practicing
lawyer. One is whether the Ledingham case is still controlling
in certain fact situations, or is completely overruled.3 2 From the
court's distinction, it might seem that a plaintiff may bring a sub-
sequent suit for damages after he has received injunctive relief,
where that relief involves a proration of water rights or some
other action in which "injury or damage was no part."33  But
even then he might still wonder if this applies only to multiple
party plaintiffs, and not to single party plaintiffs, or whether the
"complete merger of legal and equitable remedies"8 4 wipes out
Ledingham in all fact situations.
Another curious question raised by this decision concerns the
constitutional right to trial by jury3 5 under the now complete
merger of legal and equitable remedies. According to two recent
Nebraska cases,36 if a plaintiff joins his equitable and legal claims,
and is denied the equitable relief, he may retry his damage claim
before a jury. But if the injunction is granted, and the court
of equity is to retain jurisdiction for all purposes, it would seem
to follow that the plaintiffs are deprived of a jury trial.3 7 Such
a problem has also bothered the federal courts under rule 38,3 s
and has caused inconsistency among several decisions.8 9
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32 Supra note 3, at 751.
33 Supra note 3, at 745.
34 Supra note 3, at 739.
35 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
36 Gillispie v. Hynes, 168 Neb. 49, 95 N.W.2d 457 (1959); Buck v. Village
of Davenport, 168 Neb. 250, 95 N.W.2d 488 (1959).
37 Supra note 3, at 781-83.
38 FED. R. CIV. P. 38.
39 For a thorough discussion of this problem, see Comment, Developments
in the Law - Multiparty Litigation in Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 874, 985 (1958).
